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ABSTRACT
While the Space Race is often discussed in terms of international competition and
Cold War tension, the fact that both Soviet and American forays into space remained
peaceful and scientifically driven throughout the 1950s and 1960s points to a more
complicated reality that indicates a significant amount of international cooperation during
the Space Race. The International Geophysical Year (IGY), which was a collaborative
effort among scientists from around the world, served as a catalyst for beginning the
Space Race in the late 1950s, and the importance of scientific cooperation emphasized by
the IGY remained central to space exploration throughout the Space Race. Efforts within
the United Nations (UN) also served to direct the Space Race away from potential war
and toward peaceful collaboration. While Cold War tensions remained a major factor in
the Space Race, cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union were a vital
part in directing the Space Race toward peaceful ends.
This paper examines the role that the IGY, the UN, and Cold War tensions played
in the progression of the Space Race during the 1950s and 1960s. In the process it
challenges the Historiographical assumption that the Space Race was solely competitive
in nature as well as the traditional understandings about the nature of the Cold War.
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INTRODUCTION
“That‟s one small step for man; one giant leap for mankind.”1 Neil Armstrong
spoke these memorable words as he took his first step onto the surface of the Moon in
July 1969. Fulfilling President John F. Kennedy‟s promise that the United States would
land a man on the moon by the end of the decade, Armstrong and the crew of Apollo 11
finally achieved the goal that had driven the Space Race between the United States and
the Soviet Union for over a decade. As Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin made their
way onto the surface of the Moon, the United States celebrated a victory twelve years in
the making, yet Armstrong‟s comment was completely devoid of the nationalist tone that
one would expect at the end of such a monumental race. Even the plaque attached to the
ladder of the Lunar Module seems oddly anticlimactic considering the circumstances.
Rather than a message of triumph, the plaque reads simply “HERE MEN FROM THE
PLANET EARTH FIRST SET FOOT UPON THE MOON JULY 1969, A.D. WE
CAME IN PEACE FOR ALL MANKIND.”2 While the peaceful rhetoric of both
Armstrong‟s statement and the message on the plaque might seem out of place given the
context of the Space Race, the ensuing pages of this study explain that both messages
reflect the work of hundreds of diplomats in the United Nations and elsewhere who
sought to direct the exploration of space toward peaceful, cooperative ends.
In his introductory essay for the collaborative book, Cold War as Cooperation,
political science professor Edward A Kolodziej posits that the Cold War, from its earliest
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beginnings during World War II, is a grand example of game theory cooperation at work
in global politics.3 According to Kolodziej, the careful dance of the Cold War would
never have been possible without a considerable level of cooperation between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Cooperation, in Kolodziej‟s terms, “does not imply
congruent values or similar strategies,” but rather serves as “a precondition for sustaining
their rivalry at tolerable levels, short of mutually catastrophic war.”4 Crises like the
Cuban Missile Crisis and conflicts such as the Korean or Vietnam Wars illustrate the
ways in which both superpowers had to cooperate on some level to avoid total war. Even
when faced with points of major conflict, the Soviet Union and the United States sought
ways to resolve the issues without going to war.
The cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union was somewhat
forced by the advancement of several new technologies, most notably nuclear power and
its associated weaponry and rocketry. When the United States dropped the first two
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the realities of modern warfare came
into sharp relief. The technological advances that accompanied both World War I and
World War II took warfare to a new level. In less than a century warfare had gone from
muskets, swords, and horse-mounted cavalry to machine guns, hand-grenades, and
armored divisions. Further, airplanes allowed bombs and troops to be dropped deep
behind enemy lines. Atomic and nuclear technology pushed warfare to an even higher
3
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level of destruction that made total war unthinkable. Without the development of nuclear
technology, the Cold War might have resulted in a large scale military conflict, but with
the advent of the Nuclear Age and with the development of sophisticated rocket
technology came the necessity to maintain civil relations internationally to prevent total
destruction. Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) became the catch-phrase used to
describe the reality in which the United States and the Soviet Union operated for many
years.5 The nations cooperated because conflict would result in the total destruction of
both entities. While the political cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United
States was forced into being by the threat of nuclear war, voluntary cooperative efforts in
the sciences took advantage of the technological advances of the world wars in major
attempts to understand the earth and the forces that act on it.
In the early 1950s, a group of scientists proposed an international cooperative
effort to gather data that sought to help scientists to understand the earth, the atmosphere,
and the solar system. This effort became the International Geophysical Year (IGY),
which took place from July 1, 1957 to December 31, 1958 and was a major factor in
sparking the Space Race.6 Created, planned, and executed under the authority of the
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), the IGY was an international
collaborative effort that included nearly sixty thousand scientists from over sixty nations
who worked together in observing a number of natural phenomena. The scientific
5
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contributions of the IGY were tremendous, but its impact on global politics is perhaps
even more notable since it spawned the Space Race.
As part of the IGY program, capable nations were asked to attempt to orbit
satellites to aid in the observation of the upper atmosphere and other cosmic phenomena.
As the world leaders in rocketry, both the United States and the Soviet Union committed
to orbit satellites as part of the IGY program. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union
became the first nation to place an artificial satellite in orbit. Immediately and to the
surprise of both the Soviet Union and the United States, Sputnik I, a simple metal ball
with a radio transmitter and batteries, became an international spectacle. The United
States rushed to orbit its first satellites and to catch up with the Soviet Union in its space
programs as it reeled from the realization that the Soviets had beaten them in a major
technological feat. What began as a collaborative program for scientific observation
developed into one of the most expensive technological contests of the period as both the
Soviet Union and the United States started on programs to understand the world, to
explore space, and to land men on the moon.
As the Space Race began speeding up, the potential for cosmic war became an
immediate threat. The rocket technology that was carrying men and equipment into
space was the same technology that had been designed to carry nuclear warheads around
the globe, and as an extension of the arms race, the Space Race could easily turn
militaristic. Many feared that within a few years of Sputnik 1‟s first orbits, both nations
would have orbital military platforms armed with missiles and perhaps even troops.
Space also presented the potential of new colonial opportunities, and if the United States
4

and the Soviet Union both decided to colonize a particular celestial body, colonial wars
might follow. The potential gains of expanding into space were entirely unknown at the
beginning of the Space Race, and as American diplomat Craig Eisendrath explains in his
introduction to his co-authored book War in Heaven, the potential for colonial conflict
seemed unavoidable. Comparing humanity‟s expansion into space with Columbus‟
discovery of the New World, Eisendrath describes the questions facing the world in 1957
by asking, “What would follow? Would the nations of the world do what they did after
1492: arm themselves to the teeth, and carve up this new world into colonies and
empires? Would we see the Americans and Soviets in a mad rush to claim their very own
planets and various sections of space; and would other powers make similar claims?
Would the great powers begin to fight wars in outer space?”7 These were real
possibilities given the political climate in the 1950s, and in 1958 these questions
prompted the United Nations to act.
To address these potential conflicts and in response to requests from both the
United States and the Soviet Union, the United Nations created the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1958 to guide the race toward peaceful
rather than militaristic ends. Despite the fact that the Space Race was inherently
competitive, the committee called for cooperation in the exploration of outer space and
the extension of programs such as the IGY to encourage international cooperation in the
place of competition. While the COPUOS was unable to relieve the tensions created by
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the Space Race completely, it was successful in guiding the competition toward peaceful
ends through a number of resolutions, suggestions, and ultimately the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967, which declared outer space and any cosmic body to be international territory,
thus reducing the threat of colonial war in space.
At its foundation, the Space Race was born of a cooperative international effort to
explore the earth and the cosmos around it, and while international politics still came into
play, efforts like the IGY created an atmosphere of peaceful cooperation in scientific
enterprises that disregarded the rivalries present in the world of global politics. Official
entities such as the United Nations and specifically the COPUOS helped to shape and
direct the Space Race as it moved forward and assured that the rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union would not result in cosmic warfare. Without the IGY
calling for satellites there likely would have been no Space Race, and without the
COPUOS guiding its progression, the space race would have undoubtedly developed into
an extension of the already raging nuclear arms race. While humanity‟s excursion into
space was the product of international competition, it progressed successfully and
peacefully through efforts made by the United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate
in the field. As Kolodziej argues, cooperation between two nations does not require that
those nations be friendly with each other. On the contrary, two nations can be almost
entirely opposed to one another and still cooperate by continuing to participate in
diplomatic talks and by recognizing the need to prevent conflict. While Kolodziej and
his colleagues in the edited volume use this idea to examine regional conflicts that
emerged during the Cold War, this paper uses Kolodziej‟s theory to examine the Space
6

Race while arguing that cooperation fostered within the United Nations and the
international scientific community was responsible for directing the Space Race toward
its peaceful conclusion with the Apollo 11 Moon landing in July 1969.

7

CHAPTER 1
CREATING THE SPACE RACE: THE IGY
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE
On April 5, 1950 a group of American scientists gathered at the invitation of
James A. van Allen, the scientist most responsible for the discovery of the radiation belts
surrounding the earth that bear his name, to listen to an evening talk by Sydney
Chapman, one of the predominant geophysicists of the 1940s and 50s. As the night
progressed, the discussion turned to technological advances that could lead to major
discoveries in various geosciences. The knowledge of the earth as a whole was rather
limited in the early 1950s, and per the suggestion of another leading geophysicist of the
time named Lloyd V. Berkner, the group decided to propose the creation of a third “polar
year” to the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), which Berkner and
Chapman did within the year.1 Since it came to encompass much more than just polar
exploration, the scientific effort that these scientists envisioned in van Allen‟s living
room in April 1950 eventually became the International Geophysical Year (IGY). The
IGY was meant to foster international cooperation in the physical sciences through major
collaborative efforts that would take place from July 1957 through December 1958. The
IGY produced numerous noteworthy discoveries in the physical sciences; however, it
also spawned one of the most dangerous and costly technological races of the
century the space race between the Soviet Union and the United States.

1
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The historiography on the IGY is almost non-existent. From the beginning of the
event in 1957 until about 1961, commentators published a number of books on the topic,
but since the early 1960s, little to nothing has been written on the IGY.2 Walter
Sullivan‟s Assault on the Unknown: the International Geophysical Year, which was
published in 1961, provides what he calls a “layman‟s approach” to the IGY “in the hope
that the general reader will share the thrills of its discoveries and the promise that it holds
for a peaceful future.”3 Sullivan offers a considerable amount of information on both the
IGY and the polar years in much more detail than the typical layman‟s account, but he
does so in an accessible and even exciting way. Another helpful study of the IGY is
Sydney Chapman‟s IGY: Year of Discovery, the story of the International Geophysical
Year.4 Chapman was largely responsible for the creation of the IGY and worked as the
head of the committee charged with its organization. His discussion of the undertaking is
helpful in understanding the breadth of knowledge gained from the IGY and in gaining a
first hand perspective on the undertaking. Ronald Fraser‟s Once Round the Sun: the
Story of the International Geophysical Year discusses some of the major events and
potential discoveries of the IGY, but being written in the midst of the IGY, which ran
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from July 1, 1957 to December 31, 1958, his discussion of the science tends to be
incomplete and conjectural.5 Still, Fraser provides a fascinating and enthusiastic window
into what these scientists hoped to accomplish through the IGY. Beyond these initial
commentators there has been little to nothing written on the IGY, which is probably due
to the fact that IGY has become so overshadowed by the Space Race that developed out
of IGY efforts to explore the upper atmosphere.
Lloyd Berkner initially proposed the IGY as the Third Polar Year. The first two
polar years had been largely successful, and Berkner hoped, as did the other scientists
involved in the project, that recent technological advances would make a third polar year
even more successful than its predecessors. While the name was changed to the
International Geophysical Year during the planning stages to encourage exploration
taking place beyond the Arctic and Antarctic Circles, the concept was much the same as
the preceding efforts.
Austrian explorer Karl Weyprecht proposed the First Polar Year (FPY) in 1875.6
His plan consisted of the construction of a ring of stations around both the Arctic and
Antarctic circles that would make synchronized observations of magnetic fluctuation,
aurora, weather, and polar ice. He hoped that through such cooperative observations,
patterns would emerge that could be helpful in understanding the earth‟s magnetic field
and would aid in understanding weather patterns worldwide. While he proposed the idea
in 1875, the project did not happen until 1882. The FPY was primarily an effort of
5
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observation, although it was not without risk. Several teams were stranded as ice broke
up their ships or moved them off course, and an American team led by Adolphus Greely
spent three winters stranded as supply ships were unable to make it through to their
position. Only six of the original twenty-five men survived the ordeal, but they preserved
their records, and their observations were entered into the pool of data retrieved from the
other teams around the world. Ultimately, eleven nations contributed to the venture, and
the year of observation resulted in advances in meteorology and magnetic theory. 7
The Second Polar Year (SPY) was a bit more broad in its scope. A significant
portion of the observations were still concerned with understanding the earth‟s magnetic
field, but by 1932, when the second polar year was to begin, new discoveries in radio
transmission and advances in rocketry allowed for serious attempts at understanding the
upper atmosphere, specifically the ionosphere.8 In the 1920s, scientists had discovered
how to bounce radio waves off the upper atmosphere and had begun a series of
experiments to determine the height and makeup of this reflective layer. One of the
planned experiments of the second polar year was to make synchronized observations of
this reflective layer to try to understand how it worked.9
Plans to send rockets with meteorological instruments into the upper atmosphere
were also part of the original plans being considered in the late 1920s. Robert Goddard,
the American rocket scientist often considered to be one of the fathers of modern
7
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rocketry, had greatly improved his liquid-fueled rocket designs, and polar year planners
intended to send weather instruments up on several of these rockets to gather information
about the upper atmosphere. Plans were also in the works to fire a number of sounding
rockets, which were designed to explode at a particular altitude, giving observers on the
ground readings on the density and temperature of the air through which the shock-wave
passed.10 However, before any of these plans came to fruition, the Great Depression
struck.
The onset of the Great Depression made funding a major problem for the planners
of the SPY, and budget cuts forced the planners to cancel several projects, including
Goddard‟s rocket experiments. Thanks to a generous grant from the Rockefeller
Foundation, the main portions of the initiative moved forward as planned, and by August
1933, the SPY was complete. The outbreak of World War II further complicated the task
of compiling and publishing the data collected over the year and a half period.
Unfortunately much of the data disappeared, but as author Walter Sullivan points out, the
applied knowledge gained in the realm of radio communications alone “was worth
hundreds of millions of dollars.”11 The SPY also made use of information gathered
during the FPY as a basis for comparison. Both Polar Years provided similar foundations
for the IGY in the 1950s.
A resurgence in international cooperation in the sciences followed the end of
World War II. Organizations that had become politically entangled following the First
10
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World War, such as the International Research Council, fell by the wayside, and new
organizations emerged. Designed to organize but not control the thirteen major scientific
unions worldwide, the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) emerged as the
guiding force in the effort to unite global scientific research. These unions were meant to
ensure that projects were not being double researched and that major areas of study were
not being missed, and by 1945 all thirteen of these scientific unions were significant
entities.
Scientific unions stem from the original scientific societies such as the Royal
Society of London and the Académie des sciences in France. Just as these early scientific
societies functioned as a meeting of the minds within France or England, the scientific
unions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries existed to bring scientists together in
major efforts to understand the natural world and to help fund and direct research in
specialized areas. As the scientific knowledge of the natural world became more and
more advanced, these societies became more and more specialized. Whereas the Royal
Society of London during the 1800s featured numerous scientists exploring a plethora of
subjects, unions such as the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG),
which still meets today, is concerned specifically with understanding the earth‟s
gravitational field and other phenomena concerning earth sciences, and the International
Scientific Radio Union (URSI) is concerned with understanding how radio waves
function and how to make radio technology function better.
When Berkner first proposed his idea to hold the IGY, he did so before the Mixed
Commission on the Ionosphere, which was a cooperative effort among the International
13

Scientific Radio Union (URSI), International Astronomical Union (IAU), and the
International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics (IUGG).12 While each scientific union
is primarily concerned with a particular branch of the natural sciences, when the interests
of two or more unions can be served by a particular program, the ICSU helps organize
cooperative efforts among the unions. For instance, the Mixed Commission on the
Ionosphere was a cooperative effort among the IUGG, the IAU, and the URSI, and the
IGY itself became a grand effort including all of the scientific unions represented in the
ICSU. After Berkner presented his idea to the Mixed Commission on the Ionosphere, the
participating unions then passed the idea up to the ICSU General Assembly, who decided
to begin planning for the event.13
In response to Berkner and Chapman‟s request, ICSU created a special committee
to plan the IGY. The Comité Spécial de l’Année Géophysique Internationale (CSAGI)
first met in October 1952 and was responsible for the planning and execution of the IGY.
Invitations went out to all members of the ICSU, and by 1954 the CSAGI began outlining
a specific program of study for the IGY and requirements for potential projects to take
part in the IGY. All told, sixty-seven nations and over sixty thousand scientists
participated in the program. Oceanographers discovered new deep sea currents flowing
around the world. Seismologists were able to triple the number of seismographic
observations points around the world, and huge advances were made in understanding the
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way the earth‟s atmosphere filters and absorbs radiation from the sun. While tremendous
advances were made in a number of areas, as Sullivan points out, it most notably
expanded study into two fields “that mid-twentieth-century technology had brought
within the reach of man: the Antarctic and outer space.”14
Antarctica had been part of the programs of both Polar Years, but little had
actually been done. Given its remote location in relation to most interested nations,
exploration of Antarctica was much more difficult than similar efforts in the Arctic.
Several nations controlled territory that extended into the Arctic Circle, such as Alaska
for the United States, the Northwest and Yukon Territories for Canada, and Siberia for
Russia/the Soviet Union. Antarctica, however, exists as a continent of its own,
surrounded by turbulent seas and shifty ice shelves, making it a difficult place to reach.
Ships trying to land observers on stable ground were often caught in the ice shelves,
which were thick enough to trap a ship but not stable enough to hold heavy machinery.
Another problem that faced Antarctic explorers was the fact that it is even colder than the
Arctic region. As Chapman points out, the North Pole remains as much at thirty degrees
warmer than the South Pole “because it is in the midst of a sea where the ice thickness
averages less than 15 feet, so that heat can be conducted to the air from the deep and
relatively warm sea water below.”15 When temperatures are reaching –50ºF, thirty fewer
degrees does not make much difference to the human body, but it does present new
14
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challenges in keeping equipment running. Thus, it is not surprising that prior to the IGY,
Antarctica was almost entirely unexplored.
Explorers had reached the South Pole in 1911, and several nations had stations on
Antarctica prior to 1957, but no serious attempts to explore the region had taken place.
As Sullivan points out, scientists were not even sure if Antarctica was a single land mass,
two distinct land masses, or a group of islands covered in ice.16 Scientists concluded that
Antarctica is in fact one land mass through a technique called “sounding,” which
consisted of setting off explosions in the ice and measuring the amount if time it took the
shockwave to travel through the ice, reflect off the rock beneath it, and return to sensors
on the surface. It was a painstaking process, as Sullivan describes: “each shot took the
better part of a day, since thirty-six-foot holes had to be dug so that the jolt would be
administered within hard ice.”17 Through this process, scientists were able to map a
considerable portion of Antarctica‟s land mass and roughly calculate the amount of ice
covering the continent. The IGY efforts greatly expanded scientific knowledge of the
continent and also laid the groundwork for later international cooperation in the region.
Of all the activities that were part of the IGY, the best known are the American
and Soviet excursions into space, which have almost entirely eclipsed the IGY in the
public eye in subsequent years. When the CSAGI met in Rome in 1954 to discuss
possible projects, American physicist Fred Singer, one of the scientists present when
Berkner first proposed the IGY at van Allen‟s house, proposed a resolution requesting
16
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capable nations to work toward launching scientific satellites into orbit as part of the
IGY. Passed almost immediately, the resolution noted the “advanced state of present
rocket techniques” as empowering the attempt, and it outlined the hope that such a
venture would provide invaluable “observations during extended periods of time of
extraterrestrial radiations and geophysical phenomena in the upper atmosphere.”18
Following the call, both the United States and the Soviet Union committed to space
programs, and by the end of the IGY both had satellites in orbit.
The capacity for both the United States and the Soviet Union to put a satellite into
orbit was still theoretical when they committed to doing it in 1954 and 1955, respectively,
but German rocketry programs during World War II had advanced rocket science
considerably, and by 1950, both the United States and the Soviet Union were utilizing
knowledge gained from German scientists, schematics, and abandoned German rockets to
make bigger, faster, and more powerful rockets.19 Prior to the IGY both nations had been
pushing toward developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), but the IGY
turned rocketry toward peaceful purposes. As N. C. Gerson, the secretary for the
American IGY committee, wrote, “man was at the verge of the space era; a whetted
interest could induce the attempt.”20 Just as the Second Polar Year in the 1930s had
pushed radio technology to new levels, “the IGY spurred the launching of satellite
18
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vehicles.”21 While the first rockets to carry satellites into space were in fact ICBMs, by
redirecting the technology CSAGI was able to utilize the competition already going on
between the United States and the Soviet Union to advance its own agenda

peaceful

and cooperative exploration.
The primary objective of these orbital flights was to gather information about the
upper reaches of the atmosphere and magnetic field, and several major discoveries came
out of these efforts, but not all rocketry in the IGY was focused on putting satellites in
orbit. As Chapman explains, “no less than 116 rockets were launched” in an effort to
understand the “structural properties of the upper atmosphere.”22 Several of these rockets
carried meteorological equipment in them to make temperature, wind-speed, and
barometric measurements, while others were sounding rockets that set off detonations in
the upper atmosphere to measure air density and temperature. Only a small number of
rockets were designed to carry objects into space (fewer than a dozen, in fact), but these
were the rockets that caught the world‟s attention.
While the IGY brought the United States and the Soviet Union together in pursuit
of a common purpose, it failed to bring the two super-powers together in a joint effort.
The program that had been designed to foster cooperation in scientific ventures ended up
initiating one of the most intense technological races of the Cold War. Despite all of
CSAGI‟s efforts to avoid political problems during the IGY, the United States and the
Soviet Union still ended up competing, and while the space race was the most famous of
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these instances, it was not the only political problem of the IGY. In fact, even with the
efforts of all the planners, several serious situations arose during the planning process and
throughout its execution.
As a rule, the CSAGI tried to avoid playing politics at all costs. Former scientific
organizations had waned and failed once they had entered the political realm, and both
the CSAGI and the ICSU made every effort to avoid political ties and entanglements.
The ICSU‟s immediate predecessor, the International Research Council (IRC), provides
one of the best examples for this in the way it tried to limit German participation in
international science after World War I. As Europe emerged from the shambles of World
War I, the American National Academy of Sciences, the Royal Society of London, and
the Académie des Sciences founded the International Research Council (IRC) to help
guide research among member scientific unions. In keeping with efforts to punish
Germany for its role in starting World War I, German scientists were specifically
excluded from IRC efforts. As Sullivan explains, “as the years passed the exclusion of
scientists from the defeated countries was relaxed, but such was the heritage of bitterness
that some of the academies refused to join when told they could do so.”23 The bitterness
continued until the IRC was finally replaced with the ICSU, which made every attempt to
avoid the political entanglements of its predecessor.
The ICSU and its member unions were deliberately nongovernmental to avoid the
political traps that had ensnared the IRC. As Chapman points out, the United Nations
had developed or adopted a number of scientific organizations such as the World
23
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Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), but these organizations are intergovernmental.24 Each
depends on national membership and is generally concerned with political issues. “By
contrast,” writes Chapman, “the International Scientific Unions and their sponsoring
body the International Council of Scientific Unions

are nongovernmental. They are

based on the national scientific academies. In many countries these are self-governing
societies, and their members support the academies by their personal subscriptions.”25
This is an important difference in that Chapman, Berkner, and the various other
individuals involved in planning and executing the IGY wanted to avoid political issues
as much as possible. The ICSU, CSAGI, and IGY were all to be purely scientific
ventures meant to better humankind as a whole. Politics was to play no part. However,
in light of political rivalries and unrest in the 1950s, it is not surprising that politics ended
up playing a significant role in the planning and execution of the IGY. Even less
surprising is the fact that one of the first conflicts arose between the United States and the
Soviet Union.
At one of the final conferences held prior to the beginning of the IGY, the United
States proposed an effort to develop a composite image of the polar ice-cap by compiling
a number of surveillance photographs taken of the region. The Soviet Union agreed to
the effort and proposed that surveillance planes from both countries shuttle back and
forth between Murmansk, USSR, and Fairbanks, Alaska. As Sullivan observes, “this
24
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would have set an important precedent for a disarmament program which, like President
Eisenhower‟s „open skies‟ proposal, depended on aerial inspection.”26 However, the
United States had just built two Air Force bases in the area surrounding Fairbanks and
balked at the idea of allowing Soviet spy planes to operate in the area. The United States,
then, proposed that Soviet planes land in Nome, Alaska rather than in Fairbanks.
Whereas Fairbanks lies almost directly across the North Pole from Murmansk, Nome lies
hardly fifty miles from the eastern coast of Russia, making it a less than ideal location to
land. Timing was also a problem since the proposal coincided with the escalation of the
Suez Crisis in Egypt as well as the nationalist uprising in Soviet-controlled Hungary.27
As tensions mounted between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union withdrew the offer
for American planes to use Murmansk, claiming that no American help was needed to
photograph the Soviet side of the pole. Thus a potential project of the IGY broke down
as a result of international political tension.28
Perhaps the biggest political crisis of the IGY came on the eve of its beginning
when Nationalist China (Taiwan) requested admittance to the IGY despite Communist
26
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China‟s (China) insistence that Taiwan be excluded from the project. In 1955, the
Academia Sinica in Peking, China‟s national scientific academy, approached Chapman
about participating in the IGY. Given the expansive land mass of the Chinese mainland,
CSAGI was excited at the prospect of including Chinese projects in the IGY. However,
Chinese participation, as outlined by the earliest communications between Chapman and
the Academia in Peking, could only be promised if Taiwan did not take part in the
program. Since Taiwan, a member of the ICSU, had never responded to the initial
invitation sent to members in 1952, CSAGI moved forward with Chinese plans and
neglected the potential political problems created by China‟s ultimatum.29 However, in
late 1956 the Academia Sinica in Taipei, Taiwan requested an invitation to the IGY.
Despite efforts to avoid politics, the contention between the two competing
Chinese governments threw CSAGI into a political conflict beyond its control. As
Chapman reminisced:
Questions of politics were almost excluded. There was only one major
exception. This was the refusal of the Chinese People‟s Republic to
adhere to the program if participation of Taiwan (Formosa) was also
accepted. The co-operation of Taiwan was offered late in 1956 and
accepted in 1957, two years after the Chinese People‟s Republic had
adhered. The central IGY committee (CSAGI) felt unable in principle to
refuse co-operation of any scientific academy organized under a
government in control of a particular territory. Such acceptance involved
no political implications. It was with extreme regret that on the eve of the
beginning of the Year the central organization received word from the
Academia Sinica, Peking, that its IGY committee had withdrawn from the
program. Obviously the loss to the program was great. Participation in
the program was not a matter for bargaining, but one of willing offering,
by each academy according to its capacity and resources.30
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The loss of the Chinese delegation was a major blow to the IGY effort, but its withdrawal
was not as troublesome as many feared it would be. As Sullivan notes, the CSAGI feared
that the rivalry between Communist China and Nationalist Taiwan would ignite further
conflict between Eastern and Western powers, but fortunately, only Communist China
withdrew, and the IGY proceeded as planned.
The best known achievement of the IGY was the Soviet launching of Sputnik 1 in
October 1957, and while it is almost always discussed in terms of the space race between
the United States and the Soviet Union, the satellite had much humbler beginnings. The
Soviet space program was originally just an offshoot of their ICBM program, an effort
that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev was willing to allow as long as it did not slow the
ballistic missile program. As journalist and space race historian James Schefter explains,
when Sergei Korolev, the mysterious Soviet Chief Designer, first proposed a space
program to Khrushchev, the Soviet leader‟s only question was “will it hurt the ballistic
missile program?”31 When he was assured that it would not, he signed off on the idea.
Despite his later enthusiasm for the space program, Khrushchev‟s personal reaction to the
news of the successful launching of Sputnik 1 was, as historian James Oberg describes,
“almost casual.”32 Until Khrushchev realized the value of a space program in terms of
propaganda, the Soviet satellite program was little more than an afterthought. However,
this did not prevent the Soviet leader from taking advantage of it whenever he could.
31

Schefter, The Race, 8.

32

James E. Oberg, Red Star in Orbit (New York: Random House, 1981), 33.

23

Sputnik 1 did almost nothing in terms of data collection or observation of outer
space beyond proving that orbit could be achieved, although its radio broadcast gave
scientists information on how radio waves pass through the ionosphere.33 However,
Sputnik served as motivation for the United States to push its space program forward, and
by the end of the IGY, Explorers 1, 3, and 4 had achieved orbit along with Vanguard 1.
The Explorer satellites confirmed the existence of radiation belts surrounding the earth,
which were later named the Van Allen Belts after American scientist James van Allen,
and consist of massive amounts of particle radiation trapped in the earth‟s magnetic field.
Alongside providing scientists with data concerning orbital drag and upper atmospheric
density, Vanguard 1 aided scientists in discovering that the earth is not perfectly spherical
but is slightly compressed at the poles. The Soviet Union also sent several other satellites
into orbit as part of the IGY. Sputnik 2 carried Laika the dog, the first animal to orbit the
earth, and Sputnik 3 carried a huge array of scientific instruments that gathered further
information on the Van Allen Belts and upper atmospheric pressure, temperature, and
chemical constitution.34
For most commentators, the orbiting of the first few manmade satellites was the
prime achievement of the IGY. They felt that the event had served as a catalyst for
pushing humanity into the Space Age, and for the scientists involved in the proceedings
of the year, nothing could have been more exciting. As the Soviet Union and the United
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States raced to reach the moon, it seemed that at such a rate humans would be exploring
the rest of the solar system within years. In his 1964 contribution to the Life Science
Library, Arthur C. Clarke, the renowned physicist and science fiction author, explained
that NASA had “already prepared flight plans” for manned fly-by missions around and
past Mars, and he also described plans for nuclear powered spacecraft and massive orbital
structures that could spin to create artificial gravity.35 While none of these projects have
advanced beyond preliminary stages even in the fifty years since Sputnik‟s first orbits, it
is clear that to commentators during the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Space Age
seemed an irrefutable reality and that humanity would soon be spreading beyond the
bounds of earth. Through the cooperative efforts of the CSAGI, the IGY had, it seemed,
ushered in the Space Age. What was not apparent in 1958 was that rather than bringing
about the dawning of a new Space Age, the launch of Sputnik 1 had actually sparked a
Space Race.
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CHAPTER 2
THE FIRST HEAT: ROCKET SCIENCE AND THE RACE FOR “FIRSTS”
The launch of Sputnik 1 in October 1957 is often heralded as the official
beginning of the Space Race, and while it was the first successful foray into space, the
race for superiority in rocket technology had begun as early as 1945 as Soviet and
American troops raced to capture the rocketry facilities around Peenemünde on the
German Baltic coast. In various laboratories across the region German rocket scientists
had been working on a number of projects throughout the war, most notably the V-1 and
V-2 rockets, and as the Allies pushed into Germany, both the Soviets and the Americans
wanted to secure as much of the technology and as many of the scientists as they could.
The Americans arrived first and recruited the majority of the rocket scientists and
captured some of the existing rockets and designs. The Soviets, who had rightful claim
over the area, arrived later and captured the remaining rockets and technicians still in the
region. These rockets and scientists became the foundation for both the American and
Soviet rocket programs that would produce spaceflight within two decades.1
The first rocket programs in both the United States and the Soviet Union focused
on military technology. While the German V-2 rocket had not been of any major
strategic consequence during World War II, it had been moderately effective during the
German bombardment of London. Its supersonic speed made it impossible to intercept,
and advances in guidance systems made it increasingly accurate. Its strategic impact was
limited by the fact that the explosives it carried were conventional explosives that could
1
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be dropped at a much higher rate with more devastating effect from an airplane.
However its potential in the nuclear age as a vehicle for delivering warheads was
apparent to both the United States and the Soviet Union. As historian and journalist
James Schefter writes, “big bombers carrying atomic or hydrogen bombs could be shot
down. Incoming missiles couldn‟t.”2 By the early 1950s both powers had begun
stockpiling nuclear weapons, and while the United States had more long range bombers
capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, neither side had a distinct advantage.
Both superpowers began work on developing a technological edge through rocketry.3
Despite its early arrival at Peenemünde and its capture of the majority of the
German rocket scientists and documentation, the United States was unable to maintain a
significant edge in rocketry following World War II. Whereas the Soviet Union had one
rocket program working toward developing long range missiles, the United States began
with two and eventually had three separate teams working on parallel projects. The
Army had recruited Wernher von Braun and his team from Germany, but the Navy had
its own rocket program, and by 1955, the Air Force had its own program as well.
Already weakened by the division of these various rocket programs, military budget cuts
following the conclusion of World War II halted significant progress in the field.4 Since,
as Schefter points out, “any serious money the United States spent on rocketry
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immediately after World War II went into creating newer and better missiles for the
military,” military budget cuts virtually killed both the Navy and Air Force programs. 5
The Army program continued on a minimal budget with von Braun and the Army team
continuing to test the captured V-2s at the White Sands Proving Grounds in New Mexico.
With no significant budget, however, few advances were made until the outbreak of war
in Korea convinced the United States government of the need for military rockets in
1950.6
Another reason that American rocketry received little funding during the late
1940s was the popular opinion among experts that atomic weapons were simply too
heavy to be carried by “any conceivable rocket.”7 Nuclear warheads, prior to the
development of the hydrogen bomb, generally weighed more than two tons. Such a
payload seemed impossibly large in light of the current state of rocketry, therefore most
American military projects were cut. Rather than worrying about warhead weight, the
Soviet Union simply built bigger rockets. “They did not wait,” writes Clarke, “as did the
U.S., until lighter warheads were available.”8 Instead, they built gargantuan rockets, and
by the time the United States was capable of putting the 24 pound Vanguard satellite in
orbit, the Soviet Union had already orbited the 1,200 pound Sputnik 2 and was preparing
to launch the nearly 3,000 pound Sputnik 3.
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With the start of the Korean War came a resurgence of interest in military rockets.
Werhner von Braun and his team were moved to the Army‟s Redstone Arsenal in
Alabama, and they began work on the larger Redstone missile and eventually the
multistage Jupiter rocket.9 With nuclear bombs getting lighter and rockets getting
stronger, rocket programs in both the United States and the Soviet Union aimed at
developing Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) capable of carrying warheads
around the globe. However, in 1955, when both the United States and the Soviet Union
committed to orbiting satellites as part of their participation in the IGY, these rocket
programs gained a new objective

space.

While the Space Race became one of the biggest propaganda battles of the Cold
War, neither nation had more than minimal interest in spaceflight prior to Sputnik 1. The
major players in both the Soviet and American rocket programs, Sergey Korolev and
Wernher von Braun respectively, had hoped for spaceflight early in their careers, but
prior to the IGY commitments of both nations, none of the rocket scientists had been able
to convince their sponsoring governments to fund space programs.10 Sergey Korolev, the
secretive Soviet “chief designer,” had been rebuffed at least once by Communist Party
Chief Nikita Khrushchev, and even when he garnered permission to go ahead with a
satellite program it was under the condition that it would not slow progress on the ICBM
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projects.11 Von Braun was similarly frustrated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower‟s
refusal to allow the Army to launch its orbital program, which allowed the Soviet Union
to beat the United States into orbit.
The idea of orbiting an artificial satellite was not original to the IGY proposal.
Many people, especially the scientists intimately involved with the ongoing missile
programs, felt that spaceflight was immediately possible and worthy of investment. In
1951 von Braun wrote a technical article detailing the feasibility of a manned mission to
Mars that was read at the Second International Congress of Astronautics in London and
created a significant stir worldwide.12 In 1953 Dr. Fred Singer of Great Britain proposed
a “Minimum Orbital Unmanned Satellite of Earth” (MOUSE), which was to carry several
small scientific instruments, a tape recorder, and a radio transmitter into orbit. The
MOUSE would weigh roughly one hundred pounds and with the technology available in
1953, Singer claimed, as Clarke recalls, that the “satellite could be orbited for one million
dollars.” Despite its potential, MOUSE never garnered enough support to become
reality.13
When President Eisenhower officially supported and announced an American
satellite program in July 1955, the United States had three distinct rocket programs
working on separate, yet parallel, projects. The Army Ballistic Missile Agency, which
consisted primarily of the German team recruited after World War II, was working on the
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Jupiter missile. This multi-stage liquid-fueled rocket was based on earlier V-2 designs
and was the most advanced and tested program of the three. While the Jupiter rocket was
designed to carry warheads, the Army team developed the modified Jupiter-C as part of
Project Orbiter, their proposal for IGY participation. Air Force Ballistic Missile Division
was working on the Atlas rocket, which was the largest and most ambitious of the three.
The Atlas became the United States‟ first viable ICBM as it had a large enough lift
capacity to carry a warhead around the globe. Finally the Naval Research Laboratory
was working on Project Vanguard. The Vanguard rocket was the only one of the three
that was designed specifically for space-flight and not as a military missile. Its projected
payload capacity was around twenty pounds, so it had no viable use beyond putting a
small satellite into orbit.
Ultimately, Project Vanguard was awarded the bid to be the official orbital
program for the United States‟ IGY program, and the Army and Air Force projects were
redirected toward other objectives.14 As Clarke points out, “few technical decisions have
ever been more momentous, or more bitterly criticized” than the Eisenhower
administration‟s decision to support Project Vanguard over the Army‟s Project Orbiter.15
It allowed the Soviet Union to gain the lead in the early stages of the Space Race, but as
Clarke continues, “it is a gross oversimplification to say that the … verdict was wrong.”16
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Nonetheless, it was a momentous decision given the theoretical capacity of the Army‟s
rockets to reach orbit as early as September 1956.
As the Navy began preparations for the IGY and the Air Force continued with
their Atlas rocket, the Army team began a series of high atmosphere tests to explore
various options for reentry materials. One of the challenges of spaceflight is that
anything that must be returned to the surface of the earth must be shielded against the
intense heat caused by friction in the upper atmosphere. While this would become
increasingly important as both nations pushed toward manned spaceflight, it was
immediately important in 1956 as warheads were being designed to withstand the trauma
of atmospheric reentry that would follow intercontinental flight. Since the Army had the
most advanced long-range rockets at the time, the task of testing various types of heat
shields fell to them, and in 1956 and 1957, von Braun and his team carried out a series of
tests in which their Jupiter-C rocket carried nosecones of different material to the outer
edges of the atmosphere and dropped them back to earth.
While the Army‟s assignment was for suborbital flights of all of the nosecones,
von Braun and his team had originally designed their Jupiter-C rockets for orbital flight.
The three liquid-fueled stages were designed to carry a payload just beyond the upper
atmosphere and the fourth, solid-fueled stage, according to von Braun‟s calculations,
could boost a small payload over the 17,500 mile per hour threshold and into orbit. As
the Army team prepared for their first nosecone launch in September 1956, rumors
reached the Pentagon that von Braun might “accidentally” orbit one of the Army‟s
nosecones and apologize for the oversight after the fact.

33
One of the reasons the Eisenhower Administration had supported the Navy‟s
Project Vanguard over the Army‟s Project Orbiter was the fact that the Vanguard rocket
was designed specifically for spaceflight and had no militaristic overtones, while the
Jupiter rocket was designed as an ICBM and modified for spaceflight. Since the Soviet
Union had perpetually painted the United States as a militaristic, imperialist aggressor,
Eisenhower sought to avoid the image of military aggression as much as possible, and
orbiting an Army nosecone, which was essentially a prototype warhead, aboard an ICBM
presented the wrong image. Therefore, von Braun was ordered to drain the fourth stage
of fuel and to fill it with sand for ballast.17 Whether the Jupiter rocket would have
reached orbital speed with an active fourth stage is purely hypothetical, but considering
that the same rocket with only minor design changes launched the United States‟ first
successful response to Sputnik in January 1958, von Braun‟s rocket was likely capable of
orbital flight a full year before Sputnik 1 dazzled the world.
Despite the fact that the American government lauded the Jupiter missions as
great successes, Sergey Korolev, the Soviet Chief Designer, knew that von Braun‟s
design had included a fourth stage and that the fourth stage had not fired. As Schefter
explains, “Korolev believed that von Braun‟s Jupiter rocket was a satellite mission and
that it had failed. The U.S. announcement about nose cones and reentry was simply a
cover-up.”18 The R-7, which was the rocket that would carry Sputnik 1 into orbit in
October, was Korolev‟s answer to the demand for both a viable ICBM and an orbital
17

Schefter, The Race, 17-18.

18

Ibid., 18.

34
rocket, and in September 1956, it was hopelessly behind schedule. Believing that another
orbital attempt from von Braun‟s team was forthcoming, he pushed forward with his
plans at even greater speed. Several R-7s exploded on the launch-pad, and it was not
until August 2, 1957 that the R-7 made its first successful launch. James Oberg, an
expert on the Soviet space program, explains that “by July 1957 Korolev was facing
serious criticism from rival rocket experts and from Moscow bureaucrats,” and in
response to criticism, Korolev is said to have responded, “You think only Atlas missiles
can explode? We are building the most powerful machines in the world!”19 Despite the
pressure, Korolev‟s rocket finally worked. In August the R-7 became the world‟s first
viable ICBM as it carried a nearly two ton payload the length of the Soviet Union.20 By
the middle of 1957, the only thing holding back Korolev‟s hopes of beating the United
States into space was the satellite itself.
Since the R-7 was capable of lifting an incredibly large payload, the original
satellite design was a 3,300 pound satellite called Object-D that consisted of 700 pounds
of scientific instruments plus cameras, batteries, and radios.21 The Soviets had designed
Object-D to be the ultimate IGY satellite, measuring and observing everything
imaginable. However, its complexity proved its downfall. By the time Korolev‟s rocket
was ready to launch, Object-D was months from being finished. The various instruments
continued to interfere with each other, and Korolev concluded that by the time Object-D
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was ready for launch, the United States would already have satellites in orbit.22 His
solution was PS-1, a simple aluminum ball equipped with a radio transmitter and
batteries, and this one hundred and eighty-four pound, polished aluminum ball became
the world‟s first artificial satellite when it soared into space atop Korolev‟s R-7 on
October 4, 1957.
While it made no serious scientific contribution beyond proving that earth orbit
was possible, Sputnik 1 brought the international implications of a Space Race into focus.
For the Soviet Union, the successful launch was a huge technological success and a
tremendous boost for their national prestige. It set the Soviet Union securely in the lead
in an extremely important technological race that the United States had yet to realize it
was running. In the United States, the realization that the small aluminum ball that was
beeping its way across the sky could have been a warhead sent shockwaves through the
American public.23 Fear and outrage drove the American programs forward, as the
Eisenhower administration tried to make up for lost time. Internationally, the Soviet
Union emerged as the world leader in space technology with the United States lagging
behind.
Allowing the Soviet Union to be the first in space is often seen as one of the great
failures of the Eisenhower Administration.24 The Army had been capable of orbiting a
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satellite for over a year by the time Sputnik 1 was launched, yet Eisenhower had refused
to give von Braun permission, a decision that allowed the Soviets to pull ahead. Even
after Sputnik 1 was in orbit, Eisenhower insisted that Project Vanguard push ahead with
their still untested rocket, despite the fact that the Army had the capacity to put its own
satellite into orbit. However, Eisenhower had his reasons, many of them viable.
As discussed above, one of the primary reasons why Eisenhower decided to
support the Navy‟s Project Vanguard over the Army‟s Project Orbiter was the fact that
the Vanguard rocket was designed specifically for spaceflight, whereas the Jupiter rocket
involved in Project Orbiter was originally designed as an ICBM. Since the Soviet Union
was already accusing the United States of being militaristic and imperialistic, launching
the world‟s first artificial satellite aboard a rocket designed to transport warheads around
the globe would play into the Soviets‟ propaganda campaign against the United States.
While this is the most commonly cited reason for Eisenhower‟s hesitancy at allowing von
Braun to launch his Jupiter rockets, a 1962 article by Robert Crane describes another
problem facing the President

the Soviet Union‟s definition of airspace.25

The definition of airspace had been a point of contention between the United
States and the Soviet Union for several years prior to the launching of Sputnik 1 in 1957.
As a military man, President Eisenhower knew the importance of reliable intelligence,
and developing new, more effective ways of spying on the Soviet Union was one of
Eisenhower‟s constant concerns. The U-2 spy plane became one of the president‟s most
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reliable sources of information when it was first introduced in 1955. Its design as an
ultra-high altitude flyer was supposed to allow it to fly above radar and beyond the range
of surface to air missiles, and though it was effective at gathering information, it was also
risky. According to most internationally accepted definitions of sovereignty concerning
airspace, U-2 flights over the Soviet Union were an affront to Soviet sovereignty. When
Eisenhower approved the satellite programs, he hoped that satellites would provide the
intelligence that he desired without the risk of conflict that was inherent in the U-2
missions.26 If satellite overflight were internationally acceptable, the United States could
then orbit spy satellites with no risk of international condemnation or conflict with the
Soviet Union. Eisenhower would have a reliable new source of photographic
intelligence, and it would be entirely legal. However, all of this depended on positive
international opinion of orbital overflight.
By the 1950s international law had become the weapon of choice in the war
between the ideologies of Western Capitalism and Soviet Communism, and the United
Nations (UN) had become the latest battleground between the United States and the
Soviet Union.27 The problem of defining the limits of any nations sovereignty over its
airspace was a major issue in the 1950s, especially after the advent of U-2 flights in 1955.
The Soviet leaders resented the presence of American planes in their sky, and in an effort
26
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to deny the United States access their airspace, Soviet experts in international law
generally claimed that “Soviet sovereignty extended upwards usque ad coelum, i.e.,
without limitation within the airspace or atmosphere.”28 Such a definition condemns any
flight that passes through the atmosphere immediately above another nations‟ territory.
The problem with such a definition is that the limits of the atmosphere were completely
undefined.29 This left orbital flight well within the realm of international condemnation.
U-2 flights were secret and deniable. An orbiter was quite public and impossible to deny.
Therefore, launching a satellite that would necessarily pass over Soviet territory risked
garnering negative Soviet reactions and could compromise the legality of Eisenhower‟s
spy satellites.
While beating the United States into space proved to be a phenomenal propaganda
victory for the Soviet Union, it is quite possible that the launching of an American
satellite would have proved just as advantageous to the Soviets in terms of international
law as Sputnik was in terms of public opinion. Soviet legal experts were almost obsessed
with the issue of airspace sovereignty, and prior to Sputnik 1, the United States had no
way of predicting the Soviet response to an American satellite passing over Soviet
territory. Eisenhower‟s fear was that the Soviet Union would, as Schefter points out,
“accuse the United States of illegal overflight, [and] even challenge America as a
warmonger flaunting or brandishing its intercontinental missile technology.”30 If the
28
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Soviets succeeded in branding the United States as an aggressor in space, the United
States would lose its capacity to shape international space law and would be hampered in
its efforts in space.
As Sputnik was making its first orbits around the globe, Soviet legal experts began
rapidly redefining their position to allow for orbital overflights. While the Soviets were
willing to redefine airspace sovereignty to allow the overflight of their own satellites, it is
probable that they would have resisted such a shift in definition if it were an American
satellite in question. However, since the Soviet Union was readjusting its definitions of
airspace to allow for its own satellites, the United States could launch satellites without
fear of international condemnation, and Eisenhower could have his spy satellites.
While the launch of Sputnik 1 relieved Eisenhower‟s fears concerning orbital
overflight, it also served as a tremendous propaganda victory for the Soviet Union. As
the president reflected after the fact, “the Soviet satellites were a genuine technological
triumph, but this was exceeded by their propaganda value. To uninformed peoples in the
world, Soviet success in one area led to the belief that Soviet Communism was surging
ahead in all types of activity.”31 The launch of Sputnik 1 was an embarrassment for the
United States, and the Soviet Union knew it. As scholar Kenneth Osgood explains, “here
was the Soviet Union

a country barely industrialized three decades earlier, supposedly

shackled by totalitarian controls

overtaking the richest, strongest, and freest country

on earth.”32 The Soviet advance into space represented a huge threat to American
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interests world-wide, and while the Eisenhower administration had been hesitant about
committing to a serious space program, the launch of Sputnik 1 clarified the necessity of
American efforts in space.
Since Eisenhower had decided to ground the Army‟s Jupiter rockets, the task of
launching America‟s first satellite fell to the Navy‟s Vanguard project. The Vanguard
project had not progressed as quickly as expected, and when Sputnik was launched in
October 1957, Eisenhower insisted that the Navy push the timeline of a Vanguard launch
forward. Despite the fact that only the first stages of the Vanguard rocket had been flight
tested, the launch was set for December 1957. Given the level of development of the
Vanguard rocket at that point, it is not surprising that it exploded on the launch pad, but
the world was watching, and the failure of the Vanguard was an enormous blow to the
American international image that had already been tarnished by the fact that the Soviet
Union already had two satellites in orbit by this time.33
As became the trend, Khrushchev did not waste any chance to embarrass his
American counterparts. As Schefter recounts, shortly after the Vanguard rocket
exploded, “Russian delegates at the United Nations suggested that the Americans take
advantage of a Soviet program offering technical assistance to backward nations.”34
When Explorer 1 was successfully launched in January 1958 atop von Braun‟s Jupiter-C,
the Russian premier mocked its size in comparison to the 1,200 pound Sputnik 2 that was
still in orbit. Khrushchev titled Vanguard 1, which was successfully launched in March,
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America‟s “grapefruit.”35 The Soviet Union clearly had superior rocket power, but the
race was only beginning.
With the launching of Sputnik 1, the quest for “firsts” began. The Soviet Union
was the first into orbit. It was also the first to send an animal, the dog Laika, into orbit.
The United States became the first to send an animal into space and return it to earth
unharmed when a chimpanzee named Ham rode the Mercury-Redstone into space and
back as a precursor to the first manned flights.36 Yet while the United States made gains
on the Soviet Union during the early stages of the Space Race, the Soviets were almost
always one step ahead the majority of the race. They put the first man in space, the first
woman in space, and performed the first spacewalk. Their probes were the first to escape
earth‟s gravity and impact the moon. Still, the United States kept pushing to make up for
lost time and by the mid-1960s, the two superpowers were heading toward the moon.37
By the end of 1958, both the United States and the Soviet Union had satellites in
orbit, and the likelihood that the nuclear arms race would extend into this new field
forced both sides to begin discussions within the United Nations. Both powers addressed
the General Assembly of the UN in hopes that the organization would be able to direct
the Space Race toward peaceful ends. With both nations engaged in a nuclear arms race,
the possibility of that rivalry spreading into space was too real to be ignored. As is
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discussed in the next chapter, UN involvement was not always smooth, but it kept the
Space Race from becoming militaristic as both superpowers continued to make bigger,
faster, and more accurate rockets.

CHAPTER 3
DIRECTING THE SPACE RACE:
THE UNITED NATIONS‟ PUSH FOR COSMIC PEACE
For the scientists involved in the IGY and various space programs, the launch of
Sputnik 1 represented the beginning of a new era, a Space Age, but for the politicians and
diplomats who were charged with maintaining peace in a world in which war could mean
total annihilation, the Space Race represented a major and immediate threat to world
peace. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union sought direct conflict as both knew
the devastating consequences that such an exchange would have, but the fear and
paranoia that had come to characterize the Cold War era drove the rivalry between the
two great powers ever onward. While many hoped that outer space would provide
opportunities for international cooperation, the fact that humanity‟s expansion into space
came at a time that Soviet diplomat Valerian Zorin described as being “characterized by
mistrust, by an armaments race and by a division into military blocs” necessitated
immediate action to prevent global war.1
While the Soviet Union‟s initial test of an ICBM in August 1957 met considerable
skepticism worldwide, the successful launch of Sputnik 1 sent the United States into a
near panic.2 As Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis explains, Nikita Khrushchev,
who was the active head of the Communist party at this point, added to the fear through
“a gradually escalating series of carefully worded claims designed to imply, if not overtly
U.N. General Assembly, 13th Session, First Committee, [Summary Records of Meetings], 982nd
Meeting, 12 November 1958 (A/C.1/982), Official Record, New York, 1958, 193.
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assert, the Soviet Union‟s ability to destroy the United States in any further war.”3 The
development of ICBM technology was a huge leap for the Soviet Union, which had thus
far been considered inferior to its Western counterpart in the realm of military
technology. By the late 1950s the United States had a considerable number of military
bases near Soviet borders that were equipped with bombers and nuclear weapons capable
of penetrating deep into Soviet territory. Eisenhower‟s threats of “massive retaliation”
were backed by a considerable military machine, and from the earliest stages of the Cold
War following World War II, the Soviet Union had been negotiating from a position of
weakness. The development of ICBMs reversed this, at least in theory, as Khrushchev
sought to convince the West that the Soviets “could hit a fly at any distance with [their]
missiles” despite the fact that, as Gaddis points out, “problems of guidance and cost
prevented the Soviet Union, at any point during [Khrushchev‟s] leadership, from
deploying a sufficient number of launchers to obtain an assured first-strike capability
against the United States.”4 Regardless of strategic realities, the Soviet Union used its
perceived position of power to seek concessions from the United States on a few key
issues.5
On January 12, 1958 Eisenhower sent a letter to Soviet Premier Nikolai A.
Bulganin proposing that the United States and Soviet Union “agree that outer space
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should be used only for peaceful purposes.”6 At this point the United States had yet to
orbit its own satellite, giving the Soviet Union the distinct advantage of being the only
power with ICBM capabilities. On February 3 Bulganin responded, saying that the
Soviet Union was willing to consider the question if the “Western powers” were willing
to ban all atomic and hydrogen weapons and to eliminate “all military bases on other
nations‟ territories.”7 By linking ICBM technology to the ongoing discussion on
disarmament, Bulganin confirmed American suspicions that the Soviet Union had
developed its rocket program for militarily strategic purposes. Despite its efforts to
“translate technological superiority into political benefits,” the Soviet Union found
Eisenhower unwilling to make concessions, and on February 17 Eisenhower repeated his
request to Bulganin, insisting that the proposal was not meant to strengthen the American
strategic position but was meant to direct the exploration of outer space toward peaceful
ends “before its use for military purposes had, like nuclear weapons, advanced to the
point where complete international control was almost impossible.”8 By this time U2 spy
planes had already indicated that Soviet missile strength was not as significant as
anticipated, and the United States had successfully launched its own satellites, thus
stripping the Soviets of their advantage.
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The Soviets, especially Khrushchev, were not quick to relinquish their perceived
advantage, however, and in March 1958 the Soviet Union took its diplomatic offensive to
the United Nations by requesting consideration of a proposal to discuss “the banning of
the use of cosmic space for military purposes, the elimination of foreign military bases on
the territories of other countries and international cooperation in the study of cosmic
space.”9 Having found Eisenhower unreceptive to their aggressive proposals, the Soviets
tried to force the United States into concessions by involving the United Nations and by
linking cosmic exploration with ongoing discussions on disarmament. In September of
the same year, the United States sent a similar letter to the UN calling for a “programme
for international cooperation in the field of outer space.”10 The American proposal
notably omitted the military aspects of the discussion, since it had no interest in removing
its military bases around the world and sought cooperation in outer space independent of
the bogged down talks on disarmament.
The task of discussing the Soviet and American proposals fell to the First
Committee. The First Committee, which reports directly to the General Assembly, is a
permanent committee that has met to discuss issues concerning disarmament and related
international security questions since the creation of the UN and continues to meet today.
In the 1950s the First Committee played a considerable role in maintaining the tenuous
peace between the United States and the Soviet Union by facilitating discussion on
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disarmament and limiting military armaments worldwide. Since the Soviet Union had
tied the questions concerning outer space to the ongoing discussions on disarmament and
since international concern about space focused on keeping the Space Race from
becoming a catalyst for conflict, the First Committee added the “question of the peaceful
uses of outer space” as item sixty on its agenda for 1958.
By the time the First Committee met in November 1958, both the United States
and the Soviet Union had launched a number of new satellites and space probes, making
the committee‟s task all the more urgent. In March the Navy finally got its Vanguard
rocket to work, and Vanguard 1 became the first satellite to detect the slight pear shape of
the earth.11 In May the Soviet Union launched the three thousand pound Sputnik 3 into
orbit, and in July the United States launched Explorer 4.12 In October, just a year after
Sputnik 1 made its first orbits around the earth, the United States launched Pioneer 1,
which was aimed at reaching the moon. While the rocket failed to escape earth‟s gravity
well, it set a new altitude record at 70,700 miles above the surface of the earth and
reported on the outer limits of the van Allen radiation belts that had been discovered by
the Explorer satellites.13 Pioneer 1 also set a new target for both the Soviet and
American space programs

the moon. The rapid progression of rocket and satellite
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technology emphasized the speed with which the United Nations needed to move if it
were to direct the Space Race toward peaceful ends.
When the First Committee began discussion on the question of the peaceful use of
outer space in November 1958, the committee sought unanimous agreement, especially
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Given the volatile nature of the Space
Race and the fact that total voluntary cooperation was needed from both superpowers,
anything less than unanimous consent would make UN efforts to guide the Space Race
useless. However, by the time the discussion grew to a close, it was apparent that no
consensus was within reach given the fact that, as American delegate Henry Cabot Lodge
explained, the American and Soviet “delegations had entirely different views concerning
the nature of relations between States, the structure of the United Nations and the nature
of the world.”14 These differences manifested themselves in two major points of
contention. The first was the Soviet Union‟s insistence that the discussion be placed
within the context of disarmament, while the United States sought resolution of the space
problem independent of the bogged down disarmament debates, and the second was the
argument over which nations should be members of the proposed ad hoc committee.
The first issue, which the Soviet Union raised in its initial proposal, stemmed
from the changing realities of world politics and military tactics in the 1940s and 1950s.
Prior to World War II at least five major powers had maintained a more or less stable
balance of power system. After World War II, however, the world was left with only two
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viable world powers, or superpowers as they were eventually called. The United States
and the Soviet Union stepped into opposing roles as the major players in global politics,
and, as the only two superpowers, they were extremely wary of one another. Despite the
fact that the two had been allies during World War II, ideological differences as well as
dynamic personalities in leadership drove the Soviets and the Americans into opposing
corners, and as ideological enemies neither trusted the other in the least.15 Both had
sizable militaries following the war, and the United States had recently dropped the
world‟s first atomic bombs on Japan. As East and West met in Germany and across
Europe, lines were drawn, spheres of influence established, and military bases were
built.16
Since the end of World War II, the United States maintained a considerable
military presence in countries around the world. Germany, Japan, and Turkey were just a
few of the countries that housed American military bases along with all the personnel,
equipment, and armaments that went along with such establishments. In countries like
Germany and Japan, the American military presence was there initially to deal with post-
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World War II reconstruction and to help stabilize the war-torn countries.17 Countries like
Turkey and Greece, however, were fortified after World War II in an effort to contain the
Soviet Union‟s attempts to spread communism throughout the world.18 When the Soviet
Union developed nuclear technology in 1949, these bases became crucial staging grounds
for American air forces and missile batteries that were meant to hold the Soviet Union at
bay. The proximity of these bases to the Soviet Union was essential to American security
as they could easily reach key targets within the Soviet Union if the Soviets were to
attack an American target. With the development of nuclear technology on both sides of
the already cooling Cold War, military strategies changed as open war between the
superpowers would likely result in the total destruction of both parties.
The majority of American military bases around the world were air bases. This
reflected a change in American military strategy as nuclear weapons became the bulk of
the American war machine. These bases, then, were built to keep American bombers and
warheads within striking distance of the Soviet Union. As Melvyn P. Leffler explains,
along with greatly increasing the number of warheads in the American arsenal, the
“United States also increased its strategic air wings from 21 in June 1950 to 37 in June
1952. At the same time Air Force engineers constructed more than 100 additional

17

Jones points out that the Marshall Plan for reconstructing Europe was initially economic in
nature but by the early 1950s eighty percent of the aid being distributed was military in nature. Jones,
Crucible of Power: A History of American Foreign Relations from 1897, 258-62.
18

The United States‟ initial involvement in Turkey and Greece were part of the American effort to
contain global communism which became known as the Truman Doctrine. Ibid., 251-57.

51
overseas installations from which American strategic bombers could fly.”19 The hope
was to prevent the Soviet Union from striking out in any direction by encircling the entire
nation with air bases capable of striking any target within the Soviet Union.
While the United States had successfully formed lines of defense that were far
from its home territory, the development of ICBMs made any point in the world
vulnerable. Since the Soviet Union was the first to develop this technology, it hoped to
use it to force the United States to withdraw its troops from around the world. Therefore,
when the First Committee began discussion on the question of the peaceful use of outer
space, the Soviet delegate Valerian Zorin sought to link the existence of American
military bases abroad to ICBM technology in a discussion of disarmament.20
Since the first satellites in orbit were launched aboard military missiles, the Soviet
Union and its allies approached the question of outer space as directly related to the
disarmament debates already underway in the UN. As Kuzma Kiselev of the
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic pointed out, “international cooperation in the
study of cosmic space, of the kind displayed in carrying out the International Geophysical
Year programme, would not be fully effective until a solution was found to the question
of banning the use of cosmic space for military purposes.”21 Such a ban would restrict
the use of ICBMs for military usage because the ballistic flight path of an intercontinental
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missile, by definition parabolic, necessitates its passage into space. Furthermore, Zorin
held that “supervision of intercontinental missiles without concurrent elimination of
military bases on the territories of other countries” would be pointless.22 According to
Zorin, banning the use of outer space for military purposes without the concurrent
elimination of American military bases around the world would hamper the Soviet
strategic position without costing the United States anything. As L. F. Palamarchuk of
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic insisted, “a solution which gave one party so
great a military advantage could not be satisfactory. Yet the United States,” he claimed,
“was not prepared to accept an agreement covering both the use of cosmic space
exclusively for peaceful purposes and the elimination of bases.”23 Still operating from its
perceived position of power, the Soviet Union and its allies continued to direct the
discussion back to disarmament.
The United States refused to acknowledge the link between the peaceful uses of
outer space and disarmament for a number of reasons. First was the fact that the
American military bases that the Soviet Union sought to eliminate diplomatically “were
not,” explained Ambassador Lodge, “„foreign‟ in the way the Soviet Union representative
used the word, but mutual bases, to be used mutually for the common defense by
common consent.”24 While the Soviet delegation tended to paint the American bases as
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occupation forces stationed in various countries, Lodge explained that the military bases
in question were joint efforts between the host nation and the United States military.
Several American allies echoed Lodge‟s explanation just as Orhan Eralp of Turkey
contested, “There were no „foreign military bases‟ in Turkey in the sense implied in the
wording of the agenda item before the Committee. In the exercise of the right of
collective defense proclaimed in the United Nations Charter, Turkey had freely joined a
defensive alliance in order to provide for the security of its people.” Further, “they would
disappear as soon as the fear of external aggression had been dispelled.”25 Even if the
United States decided to comply with the Soviet request, the smaller nations that
depended on American support in their defense against the Soviet Union would have
blocked the effort. This being the case, linking the discussion on outer space to the issue
of eliminating such bases could end only in stalemate, and as Eralp explained, “the
opportunity for genuine peaceful scientific cooperation in the field of outer space [would]
be lost amid frustrating wrangling over general disarmament.”26
Apart from the debate over disarmament, the members of the First Committee
began compiling a number of questions that needed to be addressed if outer space were to
be explored peacefully. UN delegate Oscar Pinochet of Chile indicated the need for the
boundary between air space and outer space to be defined. As he pointed out, the United
States and the Soviet Union had set a precedent for outer space being treated differently
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than air space, but the problem of determining at what altitude national sovereignty ends
and international territory begins remained unsolved.27 Pinochet also alluded to the
problem of whether a nation could claim celestial bodies such as the moon as national
territory.28 Francisco Delgado of the Philippines further pointed to the necessity of
“establishing controls over” the uses of reconnaissance satellites, since they had military
uses.29 While several nations echoed the importance of each of these issue for directing
outer space research toward peaceful purposes, the consensus within the committee was
that more research was needed before a decision could be reached on any of the issues
brought before the Committee.
Given the sensitive nature of the issue and the need for more specific information,
the United States and nineteen other nations proposed a draft resolution to create an ad
hoc committee to examine these questions in more depth than the First Committee was
able to do.30 The committee proposed in this twenty-Powers draft would consider these
various challenges presented by space exploration and would report directly to the
General Assembly on its findings. When the United States presented the twenty-Powers
draft to the committee, the Soviet Union was still trying to push its original draft
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resolution through. By this point both resolutions were quite similar, but the differences
between the two prevented consensus between the super-powers. At the request of
several committee members wishing to continue with other issues on the schedule, the
American and Soviet delegations conducted a series of private talks to resolve their issues
and to discuss the potential membership of the ad hoc committee.31 As Ambassador
Lodge of the United States explained, the two delegations were able to reach an
agreement on the content of the draft resolution. However, talks broke down when they
came to the topic of membership.
While the United States and the Soviet Union were able to reach an agreement on
the content of the draft resolution, their differences in approach made an agreement on
membership virtually impossible. The United States sought to include a number of
nations that were involved in space efforts from each continent regardless of political
affiliation, but the Soviet Union interpreted this move as an effort to overpower the
Soviet bloc by stacking the committee with American allies. The Soviet Union insisted
that the committee be equally split among Soviet allies, American allies, and neutral
nations, while the United States insisted that the exploration of outer space should not be
treated as a polar contest between two distinct sides.32
Having reached an impasse, American Ambassador Lodge took the twenty-Power
draft resolution, including the Soviet revisions, before the First Committee on November
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24, 1958 requesting a vote despite the lack of consensus. The twenty-Power draft
proposed a committee of eighteen nations, each of which the ICSU “considered to be
most advanced in the study of outer space.”33 While Lodge acknowledged that the Soviet
Union had threatened to boycott the committee if its demands were not met, Lodge and
“the sponsors of the twenty-Power draft resolution hoped that the USSR would
participate in the work of the committee, since its cooperation would be extremely
valuable.”34
Debate over the draft resolution continued throughout the day with the Soviet
Union accusing the United States of trying to force its will upon the committee and the
United States countering by accusing the Soviet Union of trying to divide the UN into
two opposing camps. At the request of the Soviet delegation, the paragraph specifying
the membership of the committee received a separate vote. The membership passed with
a vote of 51-9, and the twenty-Power draft resolution passed 54-9.35 Despite Lodge‟s
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request that the Soviet Union participate in the committee‟s work, Ambassador Zorin of
the Soviet Union insisted that the draft resolution “represented an [American] attempt to
impose on the Assembly and on various delegations a membership for the committee
which would make fruitful cooperation impossible. For the same reasons,” he continued,
“the USSR would not participate in the committee‟s work.”36 Having passed the First
Committee, the draft resolution moved on to the General Assembly where it was
discussed on December 13, 1958.
When the twenty-Power draft resolution came up for discussion in the General
Assembly, the Soviet delegation renewed its efforts to sway the opinion of the UN in its
favor. After Franz Matsch of Austria presented the draft resolution to the General
Assembly, Sobolev addressed the Assembly to explain that “the draft resolution
submitted in that report for the Assembly‟s approval [was] not the product of agreement
and [did] not reflect the general sentiment.”37 He went on to explain that “an
overwhelming majority of the countries represented in the First Committee” sought to
reach an agreement that would be “acceptable to all States,” yet “the negative position
adopted by the United States delegation” he claimed, “made it impossible to reach such
an agreement.” Sobolev further asserted that the American refusal to discuss “the
military aspects of the problem of outer space” indicated its plans “to continue and
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intensify the rocket and nuclear weapons race which constitutes a threat to peace.”38
Sobolev insisted that the membership of the proposed committee was skewed in favor of
the United States and that the original membership proposed by the Soviet Union was the
most balanced. He claimed that “the attempt by the United States to force through the
membership it prefers by means of an automatic majority is one more example of the
United States policy of dictatorial rule, a policy which never has been and never will be
successful where the Soviet Union is concerned.”39 Sobolev further emphasized that any
committee concerning space could not hope to succeed without Soviet participation, and
that the current draft resolution would result in a Soviet boycott of its proceedings.
Through this threat and his severely anti-American rhetoric, Sobolev hoped to turn the
General Assembly against the draft resolution despite the failure of similar tactics used in
the First Committee‟s meetings.
Following Sobolev‟s severe criticisms of the United States, Ambassador Lodge of
the United States addressed the Assembly with regret that the current “session of the
General Assembly [had] been characterized so prominently by the attempt of the Soviet
Union to make every single subject before the Assembly a source of rivalry between the
United States and the Soviet Union, leaving everyone else out.” In a clever turn, Lodge
shifted the discussion away from the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union and toward the incredibly diverse nature of the United Nations. “We believe in the
small countries,” Lodge exlained. “We believe in having a big General Assembly in
38
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which every country has one vote, and we can never fall in with this Soviet plan to divide
the world into two Power blocs where there are just the Soviet Union and the United
States that do the talking. I regret that Mr. Sobolev‟s speech was very much in line with
that way of thinking.”40 While Sobolev had focused on the unfairness of a committee
that did not represent American and Soviet interests equally, Lodge emphasized that the
American goal in proposing the eighteen nations mentioned in the draft resolution was to
include nations of considerable “scientific advancement and technical activity in the field
of outer space” and to provide for the “equitable geographical distribution” of its
members. The United States hoped that the nations most involved in space exploration
would be able to participate in the proceedings of the committee and that every continent
would be adequately represented. However, the Soviet Union, explained Lodge,
“insisted, with respect to this new venture in international cooperation, that the world be
divided into two hostile camps, or two sides, as Mr. Zorin phrased it.” The United States,
according to Lodge, refused to take part in such a division, and as he explained, “if this
effort succeeds in dividing the world into a group of satellites of the Soviet Union
which does exist

and a group of satellites of the United States

and which will never exist

which does not exist,

then the rest of the delegations might as well go home.

There would be nothing left here to do.”41
Following Sobolev‟s rebuttal of Lodge‟s argument in which he attempted to
amend what he considered to be Lodge‟s misrepresentation of facts, the president of the
40
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General Assembly, Charles Malik of Lebanon, implored the two sides to reach an
agreement saying, “I wish to say how deeply disappointed I am
you feel the same way

and I am sure many of

that this deadlock has not been broken. If, even at this late

hour there is someone in this Assembly who can break this deadlock and bring about
agreement and a harmonious conclusion to this issue, he will be making a real
contribution to the cause of peace. For my part, I can only voice this feeling, and hope
that something can be done.”42 Malik was not alone in his desire to see the issue
resolved, but the delegations from the Soviet Union and the United States were beyond
negotiation on the matter.
While tensions were high during these proceedings, it is worth noting that both
the United States and the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic ties throughout this
process. With the accusations that were being flung back and forth by both parties, it is
surprising that one side never walked out on the proceedings, but both sides recognized
the importance of maintaining viable diplomatic relations with each other. Both
continued to cooperate within the UN and in their private dealings despite having every
opportunity to break off communication. Regardless of how tense the situation became,
this willingness to talk and to cooperate at some level helped to keep the world from
nuclear war during the Cold War.
After closing arguments by both Lodge and Sobolev, the twenty-Power draft
resolution was put up for vote by roll-call. The resolution passed with a vote of 53-9,
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becoming General Assembly Resolution 1348 (XIII), and the ad hoc Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was created.43 It is important to realize that as these
diplomatic proceedings were taking place, the Space Race continued to move forward.
The COPUOS was created in December 1958, but its first meetings did not take place
until May 1959, and its first report to the General Assembly was not until December
1959. This left another full year for the Space Race to develop haphazardly before the
United Nations was in any position to influence its direction.
Given the tremendous success of the IGY both in collecting data and in promoting
cooperation, the IGY was extended into 1959 as the International Geophysical
Cooperation 1959 (IGC-59).44 While both the United States and the Soviet Union
extended their IGY programs with several more satellites and space probes, both powers
began working on projects that were distinctly separate from the IGY. In 1958, in an
effort to consolidate space efforts and to emphasize the peaceful nature of American
space efforts, President Eisenhower created the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to continue cosmic efforts apart from the military programs that
were continuing to work on ICBM technology, and by 1959 most of the American
43
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scientific efforts were under the direction of NASA. Since the IGY had been extended to
the end of 1959, NASA continued to launch satellites as part of an extended IGY
program. However, not all the American satellites placed in orbit in 1959 were part of
the IGY program or under the direction of NASA, and while the UN had yet to rule on
whether orbiting reconnaissance satellites was a legal use of outer space, the first
American spy satellite entered orbit in February 1959.
On February 28, the United States Air Force launched the first Discoverer satellite
into a polar orbit. Most of the early satellites had been placed into orbit around the
equator, which allowed for more constant observation of the satellite and also took
advantage of the earth‟s spin in reaching orbital speed. While such an orbit is useful for
gathering scientific data and testing early flight systems, an equatorial orbit limits the
amount of territory over which a satellite flies. However, a satellite in a polar orbit will
eventually pass over every square mile of the earth‟s surface as the earth rotates under the
satellite‟s orbit. When the Discoverer satellites were being developed, digital cameras
were not capable of producing images of sufficient resolution to be useful, so the
satellites carried film cameras that would photograph the earth‟s surface over the course
of a few days and would be dropped out of orbit to be recovered and processed.45 The
program had significant problems with stabilization and film canister recovery, but the
Air Force eventually succeeded in achieving stable flight and canister recovery in
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December 1960.46 Despite the fact that it came at the end of his terms in office, President
Eisenhower got his spy satellites.
While the Air Force was launching spy satellites, NASA continued to launch IGY
satellites and smaller research rockets. According to NASA historian Eugene Emme,
“approximately 300 U. S. research rockets were launched during the 30-month IGY/IGC59 period. This compared with the some 400 U. S. research rockets fired during the
entire preceding 12-year period from the beginning of high-altitude rocket research circa
1945-July 1, 1957.”47 These numbers illustrate the way the Space Race was gaining
momentum. In the two and a half year period of the IGY and its extension into 1959, the
United States alone had fired almost as many rockets as it had over the decade prior.
With the increasing number of flights, the necessity for international oversight became
more and more clear. Both the United States and the Soviet Union had refrained from
launching blatantly military satellites or probes into space, but by the end of 1959, both
nations had the rocket power to launch just about anything they wanted into orbit.
Therefore, when the COPUOS began work in 1959, it was with a sense of urgency.
The ad hoc COPUOS first met in May 1959 and worked through June. In
keeping with their threat to boycott the proceedings, the Soviet Union refused to take part
in the work of the ad hoc COPUOS. While the original membership listed in Resolution
1348 (XIII) consisted of eighteen members, only thirteen nations participated in the work,
Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United Arab Republic being
46
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absent.48 While the deliberations of the First Committee in 1958 had insisted that the
cooperation of both major space powers was essential to the success of UN efforts to
maintain peace in outer space, the absence of the Soviet Union had little effect on the
work done by the ad hoc COPUOS, since the committee‟s efforts focused on gathering
information rather than setting policy.
The purpose of the ad hoc COPUOS was to collect information and to decide how
the United Nations should respond to new threats to world peace created by
developments in space exploration, and as such, the major accomplishment of the ad hoc
Committee was the establishment of the permanent COPUOS, which it recommended as
part of its report to the First Committee in 1959. Despite the heated debate that took
place over the creation of the ad hoc COPUOS, its permanent counterpart passed through
the First Committee, with the promise of Soviet participation, without any problem, and
on December 12, 1959, the General Assembly created the permanent COPUOS by
passing Resolution 1472 (XIV).
The creation of the COPUOS was an important step toward the peaceful
exploration of outer space. When the First Committee opened debate on the issue in
1958, it appeared that outer space was destined to become another front of the Cold War,
but by 1959 both the United States and the Soviet Union were willing to participate in
programs that would ensure the peaceful progression of the Space Race. This was a
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major step in the right direction considering the fervor with which the two superpowers
were condemning each other during the 1958 meetings. While the creation of the
COPUOS was a good start, it was just a start. The Committee faced a number of serious
challenges as each new landmark in the Space Race meant new challenges and potential
conflicts for the COPUOS to solve, but perhaps the most significant accomplishment of
the COPUOS in its first ten years of existence was the creation of the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967.

CHAPTER 4
THE FINISH LINE: THE OUTER SPACE TREATY OF 1967
AND THE FIRST MEN ON THE MOON
It is difficult to describe the technological advances of the 1960s as anything but
incredible. In light of the fact that both the Soviet Union and the United States had been
pushing rocket power and navigational technology to their maximum capacity just to
orbit a small satellite in 1957 and 1958, the rate at which advances were made was almost
unbelievable. By 1966 both the United States and the Soviet Union had sent a number of
probes to the moon and had orbited hundreds of satellites, but the most dramatic and best
known achievement of the Space Race was the advent of manned spaceflight. Only four
years after the launch of Sputnik 1, Soviet Cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin became the first man
in space on April 12, 1961, followed in May by American Astronaut Alan Shepard.1 As
both space programs continued to push faster and harder, the moon became the ultimate
goal and the final prize.
While the technological side of the Space Race advanced rapidly, the diplomatic
side of it bogged down early. In 1959 the General Assembly passed a resolution making
the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) a permanent committee.
Many of the nations that had participated in the discussions expressed great hope that the
COPUOS could guide outer space exploration in a positive direction despite international
tensions surrounding the issue. Much to the dismay of many of the involved nations, the
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Soviet Union had boycotted the proceedings of the ad hoc COPUOS.2 When the
committee was made permanent in 1959, the Soviets abandoned their boycott and joined
the Committee. However, they did not abandon the political agenda that had led them to
boycott the ad hoc Committee.
Despite overtones of hope and promises of progress, the Soviet Union still pushed
to link the discussion of outer space to the larger debate on general disarmament, and
they blocked American attempts to produce a binding document to ensure that outer
space was not used for military purposes. The Soviets had insisted on this link during the
early stages of the debate on the COPUOS, abandoning it only in an attempt to get their
draft resolution passed in the First Committee. After a year of protesting the fairness of
the membership of the COPUOS, the Soviet Union reentered the discussion with a
renewed emphasis on disarmament. As historians Thomas Graham and Damien J.
LaVera observe, the Soviet Union “declined to agree to restrict outer space to peaceful
uses unless American foreign bases
were stationed

where short-range and medium-range missiles

were eliminated also.”3 Since the United States and many Western

powers refused to acknowledge the link between outer space and disarmament, the
Soviets‟ participation in the COPUOS blocked any significant process for several years.4
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Despite their rigid stance, the Soviet Union shifted its emphasis away from
disarmament in 1963 and called for a binding agreement “banning the orbiting of objects
carrying nuclear weapons.”5 Graham and LaVera point to the signing of the Limited Test
Ban Treaty in 1963 as the decisive event in shifting Soviet rhetoric, and following the
signing of the treaty, “Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the UN General
Assembly that the Soviet Union wished to conclude an agreement banning the orbiting of
objects carrying nuclear weapons.”6 Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the
United Nations, assured the UN that the United States had no intention of orbiting
nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction, and in October 1963 the
General Assembly, as Graham and LaVera describe, “unanimously adopted a resolution
welcoming the Soviet and U.S. statements and calling upon all states to refrain from
introducing weapons of mass destruction into outer space.”7 Still, while the resolution
was a move in the right direction, it was little more than optimistic rhetoric, and both the
United States and the Soviet Union knew it, and as both superpowers came ever closer to
landing on the moon, the need for a binding agreement governing cosmic activities
became increasingly clear.
In May 1966, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a
letter to the United Nations requesting “Conclusion of an international agreement on legal
principles governing the activities of States in the exploration and conquest of the moon
5
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and other celestial bodies.”8 Gromyko explained that the Soviet Union had made several
major advances in lunar exploration and that the goal of placing a man on the moon
seemed to be imminently possible. As he wrote, the flights of several lunar probes
“demonstrated the real possibility of man‟s conquest of the Moon in the very near future
a feat which will undoubtedly be the outstanding event of our century.” While he
emphasized that “there is no doubt that this exploration will enrich mankind,” he
emphasized that “the conquest of the moon and other celestial bodies” would raise “not
only technical and scientific problems but also the question in what direction and on what
basis States will conduct their activities in this sphere.” This latter question, according to
Gromyko, needed to be answered prior to the actual conquest of the moon.
Even in discussing the moon, Gromyko did not abandon the Soviet emphasis on
disarmament that had pervaded the discussions within the COPUOS. Since the United
States had consistently claimed that its military bases located around the world were for
self-defense, in his letter to the UN Gromyko used the rhetoric of self-defense to poke fun
at his American counterparts. “It is quite obvious,” he wrote, “that plans for the military
use of the Moon and other celestial bodies cannot in any way be justified by reference to
the national security interests of States and are intended merely to serve the purposes of
aggression, the purposes of preparing for global war.”9 While the United States had
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never expressed any interest in militarizing the moon, Gromyko sought to head off the
possibility of such an action by precluding their traditional reasoning.
In September 1966, American ambassador Arthur Goldberg sent a similar letter to
the United Nations proposing consideration of a “Treaty governing the exploration and
use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.”10 Less caustic in his
tone, Goldberg echoed Gromyko‟s call for haste by writing “the urgency of this matter is
made apparent by man‟s rapid strides in space.”11 Alongside his letter, Goldberg sent a
draft of a treaty intended to guide the exploration and use of outer space as the Space
Race continued.
By 1966 a manned landing on the moon had been the goal of both the United
States and the Soviet Union for several years, but the serious political ramifications of
such a landing did not become entirely clear until it seemed that a manned lunar landing
was imminent. The biggest problem lay in the fact that the Moon, unlike orbital space,
consisted of real land mass that could be claimed as national territory. Such a claim
would have dire consequences for international relations as any subsequent lunar landing
by a competing power would constitute a territorial invasion, and neither the United
States nor the Soviet Union was likely to abandon its own space programs after the
success of its counterpart. While neither the Soviet Union nor the United States sought

10

U.N. General Assembly, 21st Session, [Annexes], United States of America: request for the
inclusion of an additional item in the agenda of the twenty-first session, (A/6392), Official Record, New
York, 1966, 5.
11

Ibid., 6.

71
conflict in space, the moon seemed to be a likely catalyst for such a conflict if the
COPUOS were unable to find a viable solution to the problem.
Working ahead of a problem also presented the COPUOS with a new challenge.
Up to this point in its history, the COPUOS had not been required to deal with
tremendously difficult issues. The problem of orbital overflight predated the committee,
but despite fears about the international implications of a satellite orbiting over another
country‟s territory, Sputnik 1 solved the problem by setting a precedent for international,
orbital overflight. While allowing a particular act to set a precedent had worked with the
question of orbital overflight, it was too risky to leave the question of the Moon to
chance. Therefore, the COPUOS had to work ahead of the problem and arrive at a viable
solution before any problems arose.
The COPUOS started its eighth session on September 19, 1966 with the hope that
it could successfully produce a definitive document to guide the Space Race forward.
Chairman Kurt Waldheim of Austria began the proceedings by congratulating both the
United States and the Soviet Union on the successes of their various programs and by
exhorting both superpowers to make every effort to reach an agreement on the proposed
treaties.12 The successful robotic ventures on the moon illustrated how close both the
United States and the Soviet Union were to landing men on the Moon and how important
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it was to solve the problems that could be created by a manned lunar landing before such
a landing took place.
Both the United States and the Soviet Union presented draft treaties to the
COPUOS during the early stages of its work in May 1966, and while certain articles
sparked limited debate, the tone of the 1966 meetings of both the COPUOS and the First
Committee was much more genial than earlier sessions had been. Whereas the debate
over the creation of the ad hoc COPUOS had been tremendously tense and unfruitful,
both the United States and the Soviet Union seemed to realize the importance of the task
at hand and sought fruitful negotiation instead of tedious bickering, and by December
1966, the First Committee presented the “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies,” which is better known as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.
The first thing that the Outer Space Treaty sought to do was to limit certain
actions in outer space. In Article II, the treaty declares that “outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”13 In other words,
outer space was defined as international territory. While any capable nation could
explore the moon or any other celestial body, that nation could not claim territory in outer
space. This precluded fears that the moon might become the catalyst for territorial wars
in space and also ensured that nations that developed space programs in years to come
13
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could still land on the moon. Article IV banned the orbiting of nuclear weapons or any
weapon of mass destruction as well as specifically forbidding the construction of military
installations on the moon or other celestial bodies.
While the treaty limited certain actions, it made certain responsibilities explicit.
For instance, Article VII makes the country of origin responsible for any damage done by
a faulty rocket or spacecraft. By 1966 the rockets being launched were much more stable
than the rockets of the 1950s, but they were also much larger. The failure of a rocket
destined for the moon could cause considerable damage wherever it landed, and
according to the treaty, the nation that created the rocket was responsible for any damage
done by the rocket. Article VIII takes this one step further by making provisions for
spacecraft of any nation to be returned to its country of origin if it were to land on foreign
soil. To some extent this provision took a bit of the edge off the competition between the
United States and the Soviet Union. For one, it reduced the potential for conflict if a
satellite happened to land in hostile territory. By explicitly stating that a nation must
return the craft to its country of origin, the treaty precludes the possibility of another U2
incident in which both the wreckage and the pilot of an American U2 spy plane became
the centerpiece of an international scandal.14
The treaty also clarified the status of astronauts and cosmonauts as “envoys of
mankind in outer space” and promised them “all possible assistance in the event of
accident, distress, or emergency.” Article V became a key part of the Outer Space Treaty
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as it put all nations on the same side when exploring space. By labeling all space
travelers as “envoys of mankind,” the treaty stripped the Space Race of a bit of its
national impetus.15 The Space Race continued to be competitive, but at least rhetorically,
every man or woman who traveled into space was a representative of Earth rather than a
representative of any single nation.
The treaty also sought to encourage international cooperation in various efforts.
Article X asks that all capable nations aide in the observation and tracking of satellites
and spacecraft from other nations, and Article XI requested that nations inform the UN of
any developments in technology that might be helpful to other nations and any
discoveries that could prove either helpful or harmful to future explorers. The treaty also
made provisions for international oversight of space efforts. Article XII states that “all
stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the Moon and other celestial
bodies shall be open to representatives of other States Parties to the Treaty.”16 Even
though the technology of the 1960s made inspecting any spacecraft nearly impossible, by
establishing a legal precedent for international oversight, the UN hoped to prevent illegal
activity with the threat of inspection.
The relative ease with which the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 passed through the
COPUOS, the First Committee, and ultimately the General Assembly is intriguing
considering the political climate of 1966 and 1967. The Vietnam War had gained
15
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momentum, which placed considerable strain on relations between the Soviet Union and
the United States. In fact, in his address to the First Committee in 1967, N. T. Fedorenko
of the Soviet Union pointed to American aggression in Vietnam as limiting the
practicality of Soviet and American cooperation in cosmic ventures. Not surprisingly, L.
H. Fountain of the United States contested Fedorenko‟s remarks, but the effect was the
same.17 Practical cooperation was untenable given the present circumstances, yet the two
superpowers continued to cooperate within the United Nations to arrive at a viable
solution to the problems created by the Space Race. As has been discussed in prior
chapters, the threat of nuclear war certainly helped to keep the two superpowers at the
negotiation table, but the speed of the debate over the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 can
likely be traced to the technological state of both space programs.
Throughout the Space Race the United States had always been one step behind its
Soviet counterpart, and this did not seem to be changing. In 1966, the Soviets had
achieved the first soft robotic landing on the moon with Luna 9 and had taken the first
pictures of the back side of the Moon with Luna 10.18 The United States was not able to
respond immediately to either of these achievements with anything similar. So for the
United States, the prospect of landing on the moon before the Soviet Union seemed
bleak. The possibility that the Soviet Union might claim the surface of the moon as
Soviet territory represented a tremendous threat to the American space program. Further,
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if the surface of the moon were to be claimed by the Soviet Union, an American landing
would constitute an invasion. If the Soviets landed first, the Americans would have to
decide whether to risk landing anyway or to abandon the entire project.
From the Soviet perspective, the task of successfully landing a man on the moon
was becoming increasingly difficult. Their robotic attempts had been somewhat
successful, but they had not been without a significant number of disasters, and they had
been unable to reach the moon with any object that could return to Earth.19 So while the
United States feared a Soviet monopoly on the moon, the Soviet Union feared that it
would not be able to reach the moon at all and sought to prevent an American take-over
of the earth‟s natural satellite. For both the United States and the Soviet Union, the only
safe path was to ensure that neither superpower had the opportunity to claim the moon as
its own, and as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 worked its way through the committees, it
met little resistance.
The General Assembly passed the Outer Space Treaty as Resolution 2222 (XXI)
in December 1966, and it was opened for signatures on January 27, 1967. The first
binding document on outer space law, the treaty was signed by eighty-eight nations and
came into force on October 10. The treaty finally provided the world with a binding
agreement concerning the exploration of outer space, though many felt that it did not go
far enough in providing viable mechanisms for cooperation or means of enforcement.
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As part of the proceedings of the First Committee in 1967, Ambassador Armond
Berard of France pointed out that the line between air space and outer space remained
undefined and that this lack of definition was a serious legal problem. “We find it hard to
see,” he explained, “in the absence of a definition of outer space, it is possible to
reconcile in practice the traditional principle of the sovereignty of States over their air
space with the new principle, set forth in the Treaty, of renunciation by States of all
sovereignty in outer space.”20 While Sputnik 1 had set the precedent of allowing orbital
objects to fly over foreign territory, the line between air space and outer space had yet to
be defined, and for Berard and others this was dangerous. Without a concrete definition
of this boundary, every object launched into space risked being condemned for violating
another nation‟s sovereignty and could serve as an impetus for conflict. Berard and the
French delegation pushed both the COPUOS and the First Committee to seriously
consider the problem of defining this line, but as this line remains undefined to the
present day, it is clear that they were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement on the
matter.
Many delegations also sought to define further the details concerning national
liability for damage caused by spacecraft and the mechanism for aiding and returning
foreign astronauts and equipment in the case of an emergency. The Outer Space Treaty
provides a broad discussion of both of these issues, but most delegates felt that more
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specific terms needed to be defined.21 However, talks on these issues had been slow and
inconclusive even a year after the treaty had been approved by the General Assembly,
and the loss of both American and Soviet spacemen in separate accidents in 1967 drove
the discussion forward.22
Despite its shortcomings, the Outer Space Treaty had a number of strengths. The
fact that it banned nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from being
orbited was a major move forward in the discussions of outer space. This had been a
point of contention from the earliest discussions concerning the peaceful uses of outer
space, but the United States and the Soviet Union had never been able to reach an
agreement. Defining celestial bodies as international territory was also a big move in the
right direction. Whereas lunar landings could have sparked colonial conflicts much like
those that developed from the competition among empires that followed Columbus‟
discovery of the New World, by declaring the moon to be international territory, the
treaty was able to encourage exploration while stripping it of some of its political risks.
The Outer Space Treaty also came at a crucial stage in the Space Race. The various
delegates who emphasized the imminent need for such an agreement were correct in their
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assessment of the situation in that within two years of the treaty‟s signing the United
States would land men on the moon.

CONCLUSION
As the United States‟ Apollo 11 made its way toward the moon in mid-July 1969
carrying Michael Collins, Neil Armstrong, and Buzz Aldrin, the Soviet unmanned probe,
Luna 15, raced ahead and was in orbit around the moon as the three American astronauts
made their approach. Most likely an effort to upstage the Apollo 11 landing, Luna 15 was
to make a soft landing in the Mare Crisium (Sea of Crises) and return soil samples back
to earth, but as the Americans prepared for their descent, the Soviet probe maneuvered
toward a landing and crashed. As James Oberg writes, “the Soviet failure on the Sea of
Crises, and the subsequent American success on the Sea of Tranquility, seemed almost
too metaphorical to be real.”1 After twelve years of trailing the Soviet Union, the United
States finally pulled ahead and won the Space Race on the last leg.
“From northernmost Norway, where Lapps herded reindeer with transistor radios
pressed to their ears, to Wollogong, Australia, where a local judge tried cases with his
television on, people all over Earth followed the event. An estimated 600 million of
them,” recounts William Burrows, “watched the live transmission of Armstrong setting
foot on the other world.”2 Just as Sputnik 1 had dazzled the world twelve years earlier,
Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin captivated audiences worldwide as they became the first
men to step foot on alien soil. The moon landing was undoubtedly an American victory,
complete with the iconic images of Aldrin planting and saluting the American flag, but it
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James E. Oberg, Red Star in Orbit (New York: Random House, 1981), 125.
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William E. Burrows, This New Ocean: The Story of the First Space Age (New York: Random
House, 1998), 429.
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was more than just an American victory. It was, as Armstrong put it, “a giant leap for
mankind.”
Armstrong‟s statement is incredibly appropriate in at least two ways. First, the
lunar landing was obviously a tremendous technological leap. The rate of development
during the Space Race was extraordinary. From hardly being able to reach orbit in the
late 1950s to landing men on the moon by the end of the 1960s is an incredible
technological feat. Second, it was a giant leap in the realm of international politics.
Given the intensity of the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union during
the 1950s and 1960s, it seems incredible that the Space Race never turned violent or
outwardly militaristic, and had it not been for the efforts put forth by the United Nations
and specifically the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the lunar landing
may have been something closer to an invasion.
Whether forced by the realities of nuclear war or by the changing realities of a
two – superpower balance of power, the United States and the Soviet Union cooperated
throughout the Space Race to prevent the advent of cosmic war. Despite the harsh nature
of many of the debates that took place in the UN, both sides maintained diplomatic
relations throughout the entire process. They continued to compete, but though one
cannot deny the realities of the nuclear arms race or the competitive nature of the Space
Race, their competition was tempered by a level of cooperation maintained by constant
communication. These competitions never produced the large-scale violence that so
many people feared, and this was the case only because the United States and the Soviet
Union continued to talk through their issues even when relations became incredibly tense.
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The U2 incident, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the escalation of the Vietnam War all
took place within the timeframe of the Space Race, yet through it all the United States
and the Soviet Union continued to negotiate in hopes of maintaining peace despite
differences.
The COPUOS stands out as a progressive and optimistic attempt to calm Cold
War tensions before they escalated beyond control, and in many ways it succeeded.
Neither power ever orbited nuclear weapons, despite the technical capacity of both
nations to do so; astronauts and cosmonauts never found themselves fighting in outer
space despite their rivalries, and finally, the moon never became the grounds for colonial
conflicts that could easily have developed out of the Cold War rivalry. Through the
efforts of the United Nations to direct the Space Race toward peaceful ends and through
the United States‟ and Soviet Union‟s willingness to cooperate in preventing war, the
Space Race culminated in a peaceful landing of men on the moon without any violent
repercussions. This truly was a “giant leap for mankind.” Thanks to the efforts of all of
the diplomats involved, the astronauts of Apollo 11 did indeed go “in Peace for All
Mankind.”
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